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Measurement vs Management of Long-Term Incentive Plans
Shekhar Purohit
Many companies are now adopting or considering adopting long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) where the value ultimately realized by participants is contingent on the achievement of specific performance goals which often are not related to stock-price.

While these types of LTIPs provide opportunities to focus management on results that will drive shareholder value, they come with significant risk of unintended consequences. Examples of unintended consequences include: choosing measures that do not lead to long-term value enhancement, that are not relevant to the company's current imperatives, or that can foster counter-productive behaviors; and setting goals and calibrating payouts that ultimately over-reward mediocre performance, or conversely, setting the bar so high that motivation is weak and retention damaged.

The two keys to making these types of plans work and avoiding the unintended consequences are well-chosen performance measures based on thorough analysis of your own value imperatives and thoughtfully set performance goals.

Most companies have found selecting the right measures and establishing appropriate goals easier said than done. This is especially true over multi-year performance periods where the potential payout size is large. The rewards for getting it right are great – a motivated, focused management team can make a real difference in intermediate and long-term results. The penalties for getting it wrong are increasing in today's environment of increased scrutiny on executive pay.

In getting there, lessons learned from those who have been there can be helpful.

HQ: When should a company have, or not have, a performance-based long-term incentive plan (LTIP)?

Shekhar: There are many factors to consider before implementing a plan with separate measures.in other words, a plan other than fair market value stock options or restricted stock. The four main factors are:
Philosophical: These plans can provide rewards less dependent on the vagaries of the stock market.but they also decouple executive compensation from stock price.
   
Motivational: These programs can help focus management on key imperatives and can be particularly effective in doing so when share prices across the economy are in decline.
   
Organizational: It allows a focus on business unit, not just corporate, value creation. This can be an important element in turning around a business, but it can also create internal conflicts.
   
Conservational: It allows a company to use fewer shares in its approved plans. This is particularly important when share prices are depressed and granting similar value to prior ears would require significantly more shares, all other things being equal.

  Any company that is considering a performance-based long-term incentive plan needs to be sure that it has the ability to set meaningful and sound long-term objectives and goals, the ability to calibrate those objectives and goals in terms of what good and bad performance is, and finally, the ability to measure and track the goals.

Putting in plans that will stand the test of time requires a thoughtful, analytical, and business-based approach, and clear objectives for what you want to accomplish.

HQ: What are your thoughts on the often heard complaint that it is just "too hard to set three-year goals given our changing business environment" as a reason to pass on traditional mid-year incentive or long-term incentive plan programs?

Shekhar: This is definitely a real issue. Relative growth measures can answer it to some degree. In other words, tracking your total return to shareholders (TRS) versus a peer group shows how you deliver for shareholders relative to your competitors. Similarly, if you measure growth in revenue versus peers, you are then tracking performance that accounts for the market conditions that all companies face.

Beyond relative measures, the question becomes, "Are there standards of performance we should achieve over a multi-year period when the ups and downs of the economical cycle will more or less play out?" The answer is often "yes" in relatively mature industries, but it can be a "no" in nascent or volatile industries. By standard performance, I mean that we might see an expectation that, over a multi-year period, the market expects to see 10 percent earnings growth from companies in various sectors.

HQ: Can you provide examples of the types of performance-based plans to consider?

Shekhar: Typically, we are talking about the following kinds of plans:
Cash performance plan – which sets objectives for a two to four-year period and pays out at the end in cash (or stock) based on goal achievement. A new cycle can start every year, or for high stakes focus and protection, cycles can be end-to-end. This is similar to an annual cash bonus, except performance eis measured over more than one year.
   
Performance share plan or performance restricted stock plan – which sets objectives, the achievement of which results in the vesting of the awards and a payout in stock, with the payout thus reflecting any change in the stock price over the period. These types of plans are accounted for much more reasonably under the proposed IFRS 2 (option expensing) than the old variable accounting.
 
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